On (But Not Really About) The Republic: My Thoughts on Justice

I want to begin by defining justice as I see it, independent of what I’ve picked up from Plato. For me, justice is about consistency of thought and action. Maybe it was all of the Louis L’Amour westerns my grandpa read to me when I was little, but I always saw the just man as the one that operated very strictly upon his particular moral code. What that moral code is becomes a subjective matter; I don’t think (as Plato seems to) that there is an objective or natural “right” that allows for a universal, homogeneous justice. Rather than virtue (as in, good) as a rule, I see justice as an operation of virtue: The objective operation of a subjective notion of what is good. Of note too is the way that Plato uses the word virtue to mean the particular excellence of a thing; I think that this definition still holds, though human beings have to articulate for themselves who they wish to be and therefore what their excellence is.

The early definitions from Socrates’s companions serve as an effective comparative tool for my version of justice. We first discussed “truth-telling and paying what is owed,” and these are parts of justice. In the first place, you must determine what is true as a basis for the virtue that you will uphold, and then you must maintain truth in your words and actions. Paying what is owed is more accurately “responding with what is deserved.” If someone’s actions conflict or mire what you know to be true, you mustn’t reward them. If they are acting on your behalf (if you are responsible for them and their actions), you have to reprimand them appropriately.

This begins to get into “benefiting friends and harming enemies,” but justice isn’t so simple. In terms of justice, I think a friend is someone whose own notion of virtue is (mostly)  consistent with your own, while an enemy is the opposite. If their cause is just (upon your standard), you should aid your friends and at the very least stand aside for your enemies. If their cause is unjust or would harm a friend, you should oppose any party.

In a free society and under this definition of “friend,” I think that the concept of justice as “the advantage of the stronger” actually holds. For a democracy especially, the “stronger” is the majority, which could be thought of as the collective of individuals whose notions of justice are consistent enough that they might work together and operate peacefully (i.e., with limited need to personally pay what is owed, punish enemies, or protect friends) in a society. Justice, for the collective and the community, becomes a code of laws, which would ideally be a code of popular virtue or truth. It is to the advantage of the “stronger” community that these laws are upheld, because society then represents the least contradiction for the most typical citizen. Though it is also to the benefit of the “lesser” dissidents in some ways that a code of law exists, it is to their disadvantage that collective justice contradicts their personal virtue.

Which of Glaucon’s three kinds of good is justice? A fourth, I think: Justice for its own sake is on the one hand self-actualizing and therefore liberating (it feels good to do the right thing), but on the other it is oftentimes inconvenient in that you have a duty to act in ways you otherwise prefer not to. The effect of justice is good because you are furthering your virtue in the world, but it can be bad because of the inconsistency it creates between yourself and other individuals or all of society. Plato wants to make justice a simple thing, but it isn’t. Justice merely simplifies the complexity of virtue by keeping it mindful and consistent for each person.

Am I even talking about the same idea that Plato is when I define justice? Centuries in translation ensure that I am not. I tend to think his idea in broadest terms is that what is good (justice) is a product of how the world and people actually are (nature). But the nature of a person isn't inherent; culture and others factors play a role. There isn't a "good" that is best for everyone, but there might be a utilitarian good that makes the most people the most consistent within society. Philosopher-kings can't find that kind of good, though; it takes a society so structured as to allow everyone a voice.